

tanks. At LATP, the armor packages remain in the transportation containers until they are ready to be inserted into the tank. Following installation of the armor package and other tank components, the completed tanks are transported to military units as required for field use. Field use consists primarily of training exercises and varying levels of maintenance performed either by the tank operating crew or a field maintenance crew. Some maintenance, including major repairs, is conducted at maintenance depots by dedicated crews. At some point in the future, the tanks will be removed from service, demilitarized, and dispositioned.

D. The impacts of the use of DU armor are central to the question of whether the impacts of continued use of the M1 Abrams MBT remains insignificant. The use of DU armor is the primary feature that distinguishes the Abrams tank from numerous other commonly accepted equipment employed by the military and industry. Conventionally-armored military vehicles and heavy equipment, similar to tanks, are commonly operated by the Army and industry in a manner that is considered by the public to be acceptable and with insignificant impact on the human environment. Consequently, in conformance with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) this Environmental Assessment (EA) has focused strictly on the use of DU armor.

3. Anticipated Environmental Effects

A. The M1 Abrams MBT Heavy Armor System will be assembled, transported, maintained, and disposed of in accordance with applicable environmental protection regulations. The PM Abrams has performed an in-depth study of exposure scenarios for affected personnel and has found that, in all instances, the maximum potential exposure to radiation from the Heavy Armor System will fall well under the 100 mrem/year NRC limit.

B. The PM Abrams has determined that the potential for adverse environmental impacts of the use and disposal of the Heavy Armor package occur only if the outer armor integrity has been compromised or if a large number of rounds are fired into the tank. In this instance, however, decontamination measures can be limited to a 76-meter area downwind of the impact site (for a worst-case scenario). The concentration of the aerosol in the passing cloud does not exceed the guidelines for the general population as set forth in 10 CFR Part 20.

C. The PM Abrams will continue to assess alternative procedures and materials for opportunities to replace the DU used for the Heavy Armor System and to proactively implement environmental improvements to the program in other areas.

4. Facts and Conclusions

A. Operations at LATP are conducted in accordance with their Radiation Protection Plan and personnel exposures are controlled within the regulatory limits. Potential hazards have been identified and evaluated and appropriate preventive measures have been taken. Efforts have been made to reduce radiation exposures below the limits and to minimize the number of personnel subjected to radiation exposure.

B. Transportation of completed tanks from LATP to field organizations for use is conducted in compliance with Department of Transportation requirements for the transportation of articles containing depleted uranium. Compliance with Department of Transportation requirements assures appropriate protection of the involved personnel and members of the general public from the potential radiation and other hazards associated with transportation.

C. Storage and Parking of tanks at field installations has been evaluated and it has been determined that there is no reasonable potential for exposure of personnel or the general public to radiation exposures exceeding the limits allowed for members of the general public.

D. Fields use of the Abrams Tank with Heavy Armor has been evaluated and it has been determined that appropriate controls exist in the form of vehicle design, vehicle use, and vehicle maintenance to assure that radiation exposure to involved personnel and the general public is maintained within the required regulatory limits and that efforts have been made to reduce radiation exposures below the limits.

E. The environmental effects of accidents involving the release of DU have been evaluated and appropriate actions have been identified to assure mitigation and minimize the potential for environmental damage.

F. Means have been identified and agreements have been made that assure that the DU is properly managed and controlled during and following demilitarization.

G. Means have been identified and agreements have been made that assure that all DU wastes generated by the Abrams Heavy Armor System are properly managed and disposed.

5. Determination

Based on the analyses of the draft EA, the use of DU armor from its receipt by the Abrams program through disposition of the material following future demilitarization of the Abrams tanks, including reasonably foreseeable accidents, do not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the NEPA. Therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed action is not required.

Gregory D. Showalter,

Army Federal Register Liaison Officer.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Defense Intelligence Agency, Science and Technology Advisory Board Closed Panel Meeting

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of Subsection (d) of Section 10 of Pub. L. 92-463, as amended by Section 5 of Pub. L. 94-409, notice is hereby given that a closed meeting of the DIA Science and Technology Advisory Board has been scheduled as follows:

DATES: 24 July 1998 (800am to 1600pm).

ADDRESSES: The Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Maj Michael W. Lamb, USAF, Executive Secretary, DIA Science and Technology Advisory Board, Washington, DC 20340-1328 (202) 231-4930.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The entire meeting is devoted to the discussion of classified information as defined in Section 552b(c)(1), Title 5 of the U.S. Code and therefore will be closed to the public. The Board will receive briefings on and discuss several current critical intelligence issues and advised the Director, DIA, on related scientific and technical matters.

Dated: July 8, 1998.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register, Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

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